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SUMMARYContrary to often-heard concerns, the main question regarding the future of the
European single currency is not who is going to leave, but who is going to join. Three of the new
EU member states want to join Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and adopt the euro
within the next year, and others are due to follow within the next decade. The experience of the
first seven years demonstrates that membership has its benefits, but that these benefits are
not free. Being part of a currency union requires discipline, and the loss of the exchange rate
as an instrument for coping with economic shocks can be costly. Within the euro area some
members, such as Ireland, are thriving; others, especially among the southern member sta-
tes, are struggling and face painful adjustments in the future.   As the chart below illustrates,
economic divergences between existing members have been significant. Ireland and Portugal
have experienced marked real exchange rate appreciation, but with very different consequen-
ces for export growth. There has been real depreciation in both Germany and France, but only
Germany’s exports have flourished.      
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The policy discussion to date has almost exclusively
focused on the implementation of the Stability and
Growth Pact. Divergences in growth and inflation
have not been given sufficient attention. At the
national level, wage and price flexibility in response
to economic conditions is essential, and govern-
ments must avoid fiscal policies that aggravate
divergences. Enhanced surveillance by European
institutions of economic performance and policies
in euro area member states is also vital. As regards
euro area enlargement, policymakers should be
ready to apply more sophisticated entry criteria
than in the past, even if that entails the risk of being
portrayed as “unfair”. What is needed is a more refi-
ned filter for deciding on membership than the
Maastricht criteria. These have proven to be ill-des-
igned to assess whether structural convergence is
sufficient to make  participation in EMU sustainable.
and  Jean Pisani-Ferry
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RELATIVE EXPORT GROWTH
EURO AREA DIVERGENCES:
A COMPARISON OF REAL EXCHANGE
RATES AND GROSS EXPORTS
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Ireland and Portugal have had above average
inflation - but Ireland combined it with strong
exports. France and Germany have gained
price competitiveness, but only German exports
have flourished.
Source: Eurostat
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BY THE ENDof the decade the euro
area may have expanded from the
current 12 members to 19 mem-
bers. The new member states’ des-
ire to join EMU is understandable.
Membership has its advantages: a
monetary anchor, lower interest
rates, no speculative attacks on
the exchange rate, lower transac-
tion costs, and closer integration
with current euro area members. 
But these benefits are not free.
Being part of a currency union
involves discipline, and for the
export-dependent participants the
loss of the exchange rate as an
instrument for coping with econo-
mic shocks can be costly.
In retrospect, a lesson from the
first seven years of EMU is that
those disciplines and potential
costs have been underestimated.
The policy discussion has almost
exclusively focused on the imple-
mentation of the Stability and
Growth Pact. Persistent divergen-
ces in growth and inflation, which
we examine in Section 1, have not
been given sufficient attention by
national and European policyma-
kers. The damaging effects of
divergences now call for both pain-
ful corrective policies in member
economies that have been marred
by a loss in competitiveness
(Section 2), and for the introduc-
tion of a stronger surveillance fra-
mework to prevent similar pro-
blems arising in the future
(Section 3).
There are also lessons to draw for
the new member states (Section
4). Given their level of develop-
ment, the economic structures
and financial systems in the new
member states will continue to
change as they converge to
income levels in the EU-15 coun-
tries. These changes may require
significant real exchange rate
adjustment if the new member
states are to maintain internatio-
nal competitiveness and prevent
deep recessions and bouts of high
inflation. Within EMU, real
exchange rate adjustment can
only be brought about through
changes in domestic prices and
wages. Beyond the nominal entry
1. PERFORMANCE 
MEASURES
Some countries have fared better
than others under EMU. Table 1
documents the differences in real
GDP growth rates across the euro
area since 1999. Growth in
Ireland, Greece and Spain has
significantly outpaced average
euro area growth, while Germany,
Italy and Portugal have underper-
formed. Strong growth in Spain
and Greece has been driven by
robust domestic demand, whereas
their export performance has been
mediocre. Weak net exports have
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TABLE 1.  REAL GDP GROWTH 
(Annual avg. 1999-2005) 
CONTRIBUTIONS
FROM:
Real
GDP
Domestic
Demand
Net 
Exports
Ireland 6.3 4.4 1.9
Greece 4.1 4.5 -0.4
Spain 3.6 4.6 -1.0
Finland 2.7 1.9 0.8
France 2.2 2.6 -0.4
Belgium 2.0 1.7 0.3
Austria 2.0 1.4 0.6
Netherlands 1.6 1.2 0.4
Portugal 1.5 1.8 -0.3
Italy 1.3 1.5 -0.2
Germany 1.2 0.4 0.8
Euro Area 1.9 1.8 0.1
Source: OECD  Source: Eurostat 
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DEPRECIATION
criteria spelled out in the
Maastricht treaty, the key ques-
tions, therefore, are to what extent
the new member states are at risk
of being hit by severe asymmetric
shocks, and whether they can
adjust to such shocks through
internal flexibility. In deciding who
is fit for membership in the single
currency, the EU should avoid
hiding behind ill-designed nominal
criteria and address these ques-
tions explicitly.
1Intra euro area real
trade-weighted
exchange rates,
based on Consumer
Price Indices.THE EURO: ONLY FOR THE AGILE
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also depressed growth in Italy and
Portugal, along with sluggish
domestic demand. Remarkably,
German domestic demand has
barely grown since 1999, and the
moderate growth that Germany
has registered has been entirely
due to net exports. 
The dispersion of
growth rates across
euro area countries
is not especially
large, being similar
in size to the disper-
sion across the US
2.
Unlike in the US,
however, growth dif-
ferentials in the
euro area are persis-
tent,  and evidence
shows that it is the
trend rate of growth that drives
these differentials, rather than
countries simply being at different
stages in the output cycle. In fact,
business cycles have become
strongly synchronised in the euro
area
3. 
Persistent differences in inflation
rates across countries are another
feature of the euro area. Here also,
at any point in time the dispersion
of inflation across the euro area is
not unusually large; but, as a
result of prolonged differences in
inflation rates, euro area econo-
mies have experienced very sizea-
ble swings in their real exchange
rates vis-à-vis their peers, as
shown in Chart 1. These inflation
differentials largely reflect domes-
tic factors, especially growth in
wages, and are highest in the non-
traded goods sector. 
Generally speaking, countries with
the strongest growth in domestic
demand also registered the
highest rates of inflation (Chart
2). Portugal is the only notable
exception.
The changes in competitiveness
resulting from these movements
in real exchange rates appear to
have played a role in bringing
about large swings in current
account balances in several coun-
tries. Portugal and Spain are now
running large current
account deficits,
while Germany and
several other
higher-income
countries are run-
ning large surpluses.
As savings and
investment have
become increasingly
decoupled in EMU
countries, the disper-
sion of current
account balances
has trended up
over the last 15 years (Chart 3). 
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“Savings and
investments
have become
increasingly
decoupled in
EMU countries.”
2. PROBLEM COUNTRIES
It is important to note that growth
and inflation differentials are not
undesirable per se. Whether the
observed differences are desirable
or undesirable depends in large
part on the nature of the shocks
that are causing the divergences.
In a currency union with different
economies and asymmetric
shocks, some divergence between
members is to be expected and is
even necessary. Distinguishing
welcome from unwelcome diffe-
rentials requires case-by-case
economic analysis of initial condi-
tions and underlying factors. 
The two countries with the highest
inflation rates, Ireland and
Portugal, are a case in point. In
Ireland, real exchange rate appre-
2See Angeloni and
Ehrmann (2004)
and Gonzalez-
Paramo (2005).
3See Lane (2006)
and de Bandt,
Herrmann and Parigi
(2006).b
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THE EURO: ONLY FOR THE AGILE
BOX 1: THE “CHINA SHOCK” TO ITALY AND PORTUGAL
An important factor behind the current economic problems in
Italy and Portugal is the lack of structural transformation that has
left both countries vulnerable to competition from low-cost produ-
cers, especially China and the new EU member states. Italy and
Portugal entered EMU with industrial structures that placed them
directly in China’s line of fire. As shown in the charts below, both
countries have suffered declines in market share of key export
products at the same time as China’s share of these markets has
surged. Membership of EMU has both exacerbated the loss of
competitiveness and narrowed the policy options for responding
to the external shocks that have buffeted both economies.
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ciation has been offset by rapid
advances in productivity and move-
ments up the value chain in the tra-
ded-goods sector. As a result,
Ireland’s competitiveness has not
suffered, as witnessed by the boom
in exports (Chart 4). 
In contrast, above-average inflation
has led to a marked deterioration in
Portugal’s competitiveness, which
has depressed exports. Portugal
enjoyed a spurt in growth in domes-
tic demand and in the construction
sector around the time of EMU entry,
as real interest rates declined by
more than 6 percentage points and
credit to households expanded
rapidly. Budgetary policy added to
the expansion because the benefits
from a reduced interest debt burden
were entirely passed on to private
agents. However, the honeymoon
was short-lived as the loss of compe-
titiveness eventually began to domi-
nate. ls
x
Chart 4 illustrates the situations of
the other EMU members that have
also had above-average inflation.
Italy bears a strong resemblance to
Portugal, with sluggish domestic
demand and weak exports.
Importantly, slow productivity
growth and the composition of Italy’s
and Portugal’s exports left them vul-
nerable to international competition
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4The output gap is
the difference bet-
ween actual and
potential GDP.
BOX 2: REAL INTEREST RATES IN GERMANY 
Real interest rates in Germany have declined from their
peaks in 2000, as the ECB cut nominal interest rates
and as German inflation picked up a little from very low
rates. However, we estimate that the German “equili-
brium” real interest rate—that is, the real interest rate
that would provide enough stimulus to demand to use
up spare capacity in the economy—has also declined
over recent years, so that the level of real interest rates
has remained restrictive (see Chart 6 below). Given the
large amount of economic slack at present, we estimate
that, other things being equal, negative real interest
rates in Germany would be needed to close the output
gap
4  over the next few years.
The calculations above are based on German Consumer-
Price-Index (CPI) data. Domestic consumer prices are
clearly relevant for households’ consumption and
savings decisions, but less relevant for exporting firms’
investment decisions. In Chart 6 we plot an alternative
measure of the German real interest rate based on a
weighted combination of domestic and foreign prices,
where the weights reflect the size of exporters’ invest-
ment spending in aggregate expenditure. The closeness
of the two measures suggests that, contrary to some
claims, using domestic price indices can result in accu-
rate calculations in real interest rates.
from low-cost producers, especially
China (see Box 1). Adjustment to
global shocks would have required
real exchange rate depreciation in
Italy and Portugal, not the real
appreciations that both countries
experienced. In both countries,
restoring competitiveness will
require a prolonged period of
below-euro-area-average growth
in unit labour costs.Greece and
Spain have also perforccmed rela-
tively poorly when measured by
exports. To date, robust domestic
demand, driven in part by activity
in the construction sector, has
more than outweighed weak
exports. Our concern is that when
the temporary boost from the
EMU-induced drop in real interest
rates and rising property prices
eventually fades, they may well be
facing similar problems to those
Portugal is facing today.
At the other end of the scale is
Germany, where persistent excess
capacity in the economy, because
of weak domestic demand, has
kept inflation below the euro area
average. With a common nominal
interest rate across the euro area,
below-average inflation has resul-
ted in above-average (ex-post) real
interest rates in Germany, which
has further depressed domestic
demand and inflation (see Box 2). 
Below-average inflation has set in
motion an economic force that
works to offset the drag from high
real interest rates: German expor-
t e r s h ave becom e m ore com peti-
tive—the so-called “competitive-
ness channel” of adjustment—and
German exports have surged. Over
time, the competitiveness channel
may come to dominate the depres-
sing effect of high real interest
rates, but the German case shows
that this adjustment process
takes a damagingly long time,
even in a highly open economy.
The announced 2007 tax hike
should further delay the revival of
domestic demand.
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5In his speech on the
future of the IMF of 20
February 2006.
Finally, the euro area should avoid
putting itself in a situation where its
members pursue inconsistent goals.
In this respect, further depreciation
of Germany’s real exchange rate vis-
à-vis the rest of the euro area would
be inconsistent with the need to res-
tore price competitiveness in several
other countries.   
B. INSTITUTIONAL DIMENSIONS. 
As well as changes in polices at the
national level, changes at the
Community level in how problems in
individual member states are
approached are also needed.
Enhanced surveillance by European
institutions of economic perfor-
mance and policies in euro area
member states is vital. Such monito-
ring would aim to
identify problems in
individual member
states that could
spill over into the
rest of the euro area.  
Currently, multilate-
ral surveillance in
the euro area has
two arms: a relati-
vely strong one, the
Stability and Growth
Pact (SGP); and a relatively weak
one, the monitoring of economic poli-
cies under Article 99 of the Treaty.
Budgetary surveillance under the
SGP aims at containing fiscal imba-
lances that are a source of harmful
divergence. However, monitoring
member states’ fiscal positions is
not sufficient. After all, Spain is cur-
rently running a small fiscal surplus.
Moreover, Portugal made significant
policy mistakes during the period
1995-1999 at a time when its head-
line budget deficit was declining
from 5 per cent to below 3 per cent.
There is therefore a need to streng-
then the “weak” arm. First, the
European Commission should speak
up and use its so called “right of
alert” to single out problem coun-
tries. Bank of England Governor
Mervyn King recently reminded us
5
3. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
FOR CURRENT MEMBERS
Economic problems in EMU member
states are not only a matter for
national governments. Even putting
aside the risk of an eventual break-
up, they are a common concern for
the whole euro area. Difficulties in
individual euro area countries spill
over and affect other EMU member
states via two channels.
  Financial linkages.EMU member
states are exposed to developments
in the rest of the euro area through
large and growing cross-border hol-
dings of assets. For example, recent
data show that other euro area mem-
ber states hold about €70 billion in
Portuguese assets and thus would
suffer significant negative wealth
effects should the value of these
assets decline markedly.
  Monetary policy. Very low infla-
tion, or even deflation, in one EMU
member country undergoing disin-
flationary adjustment pulls down
average euro area inflation. In res-
ponse, the European Central Bank
would run a more expansionary
monetary policy than would other-
wise be the case. The resulting looser
monetary conditions would push up
inflation in other EMU member sta-
tes, leading to greater divergence. 
A. WHAT TO DO AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL.
For the countries in EMU with the
severest problems, i.e. Portugal and
Italy, there can be no solution other
than the long, hard slog of structural
adjustment. The first priority should
be to make sure that divergence
does not become any worse. This
calls for wage moderation and
increased competition in goods and
services markets to bring inflation
down below the euro area average. 
Other members of the euro area
should also implement policies to
improve the functioning of adjust-
ment mechanisms. In the short run,
these reforms may be especially
important for Spain and Greece,
given the concerns we have mentio-
ned about these economies. In the
medium run, these reforms matter
for all euro area members.
First, the “competitiveness channel”
through which a loss of price compe-
titiveness generates economic slack
that eventually corrects the real
appreciation needs to be strengthe-
ned. Particularly important in this
regard is a wage formation process
that makes wages respond swiftly to
economic conditions. Increased
competition in product markets
should also increase the responsive-
ness of domestic prices to shocks.
The completion of the single market
for services would help
in this regard. 
Second, it is clear that
built-in fiscal stabilizers
should be allowed to
work fully and that
national governments
should avoid pro-cycli-
cal fiscal policies that
aggravate divergences.
Portugal’s experience
suggests that the fiscal
discipline in place
during the pre-EMU years can easily
be thrown aside once the goal of
EMU entry has been achieved. In the
countries that need to undergo a real
exchange rate adjustment, fiscal
policy should be geared towards
supporting it.  
Third, there may be a role for enhan-
ced prudential and regulatory poli-
cies to help avoid asset price booms
and busts in individual member
countries. In particular, tighter regu-
lations on household borrowing
might be desirable in some countries
experiencing credit booms. At the
very least, careful monitoring of cre-
dit expansion is essential to prevent
an overshooting of domestic prices,
especially for those members who
have to adjust to lower interest rates
than they have historically been
accustomed to. 
“The European
Commission
should use its
right of alert to
single out pro-
blem countries.”THE EURO: ONLY FOR THE AGILE
07
b
r
u
e
g
e
l
p
o
l
i
c
y
b
r
i
e
f
that Keynes placed faith in “ruthless
truth-telling” and this should apply
to the Commission. Second, the
Eurogroup should have frank discus-
sions on potential problems and
remedies and make sure that their
conclusions are brought to the atten-
tion of the relevant governments.
The treaty-based community instru-
ment, the so-called Broad Economic
Policy Guidelines (or the newly adop-
ted Integrated Guidelines) is too
weak to be relied upon, and plays vir-
tually no role in the national policy
debates. Therefore, whenever nee-
ded, the President of the Eurogroup
should be given the mandate to
engage in direct discussions with
national governments. Finally, the
specific euro-area dimension of
structural surveillance – which is
associated with the Lisbon Agenda –
should be strengthened. At least, the
list of reform priorities should expli-
citly include measures that are nee-
ded to improve the functioning of
EMU.
4. POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR
NEW EMU APPLICANTS
Our analysis also throws light on the
issue of euro area enlargement. As
shown in Charts 7 and 8, many of the
new EU member states have expe-
rienced solid growth in domestic
demand as well as considerable real
exchange rate appreciation vis-à-vis
current euro area members and a
boom in exports. On these dimen-
sions, they have more in common
with Ireland than with Portugal.
At first glance, therefore, our data
deliver an optimistic assessment. In
judging whether EMU membership is
right for the new EU member states,
however, there are other dimensions
that need to be considered.
First, compared with current EMU
members, the potential benefits for
the new EU member states of joining
EMU are greater, but so too are the
potential costs. The new EU member
states probably face larger asymme-
tric shocks, and this matters, even
though they have more flexible eco-
nomies than the current members. 
Second,  the Maastricht criteria
based on inflation, long-term inte-
rest rates, exchange rate stability
and public finances are neither
necessary nor sufficient to deter-
mine suitability for EMU member-
ship. They are not necessary
because higher inflation can be a
consequence of rapid economic
catch-up. They are not sufficient
because satisfying the price stabi-
lity criterion in the run-up to EMU
entry does not guarantee that infla-
tion will remain low once member-
ship has been achieved. In a similar
vein, the fiscal discipline displayed
prior to EMU entry can easily disap-
pear once in the euro area, espe-
cially if budgetary accounting tricks
were used to satisfy the criteria on
government deficits and debt.
Third, real convergence matters.
Here, the new member states’ record
is more mixed. Trade and foreign
direct investment (FDI) integration
with current EMU members has pro-
gressed quickly in recent years and
is now fairly advanced. However, out-
put per capita remains far below the
average euro-area level, and conver-
gence in output specialisation to EU
norms  has been slow: significantly,
agriculture and manufacturing still
weight more than in the current EMU
members, and services are relatively
underdeveloped. As convergence
CZECH REP.
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rates may have to adjust, especially
in the context of changing world
trade patters as a consequence of
the rise of China.  
It is frequently argued that the new
EU member states
should be judged solely
on the basis of the
Maastricht criteria
because these were the
yardsticks applied to
the current members.
But EMU is a learning
process, and we have
learnt that nominal
convergence is not
enough to ensure that a
country is fit for the
euro. Furthermore,
Article 121 of the Treaty
explicitly mentions that
“a high degree of sustai-
nable convergence” is a
condition for member-
ship. This should be
taken as a basis for a broad assess-
ment of a country’s effective and
lasting ability to participate in the
single currency. 
One feature of the recent perfor-
mance of the new member states
has been their large current-account
THE EURO: ONLY FOR THE AGILE
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deficits. In large part, deficits reflect
high prospective returns on invest-
ment in these countries as a result of
their low capital-labour ratios.
Tellingly, much of the capital inflow
has taken the form of FDI, which may
limit vulnerability and has facilitated
technology trans-
fer. However,
convergence
towards a steady
state where exter-
nal liabilities
represent a
constant propor-
tion of GDP would
imply for some
countries an
adjustment in the
trade balance of
the order of mag-
nitude of 5 per
cent of GDP or
more
6.  This again
raises the issue of
the corresponding
real exchange rate
adjustment. 
To be sure, EMU entry should accele-
rate the process of real integration.
In turn, increased trade integration
with greater intra-industry trade
should lead to increased synchroni-
sation of business cycles with fewer
asymmetric shocks. However, this
process takes considerable time.
Prudent macroeconomic polices and
microeconomic reforms will be nee-
ded to facilitate these advances. But
convergence is rarely smooth, and
substantial real exchange rate
adjustments may be required along
the way.
The question, therefore, is not whe-
ther EMU is suitable only for rich
countries. The level of per-capita real
GDP in itself should not be a criterion
for entry into EMU. The deciding
question should be whether coun-
tries for which the potential for diver-
gence is significant have taken the
necessary measures to minimise
this risk.  
It is illusory to believe that a well-
functioning single currency area can
emerge spontaneously; members
have to work hard to make it happen.
A reformed and enlarged EMU offers
the potential of enormous benefits,
but only for those countries that are
willing to get into shape.
We thank Narcissa Balta for her
assistance in preparing this Policy
Brief.
“EMU is a learning
process; nominal
convergence is not
enough to ensure
that a country is fit
for the euro.” 
6See Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti (2006)
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